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This paper seeks to examine the relationship between smoking bans and the propensity
of tobacco ﬁrms to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). Using international busi-
ness theory based on the ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantage/country-speciﬁc advantage (FSA/CSA)
matrix, the authors show that, contrary to what one may expect, smoking bans at home
are an important institutional intervention, reducing the propensity for ﬁrms to engage in
FDI, even to countries without a ban themselves.
Introduction
The importance of institutions in both the context
of international business (IB), and indeed in
explaining variations in ﬁrm performance has
been in the spotlight for some time. Often, this is
discussed within the context of emerging markets,
and how improving institutions leads to ﬁrm
performance (Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009);
building on the broader seminal analysis of insti-
tutional quality by Crawford and Ostrom (1995).
This literature essentially argues that institutional
quality is a crucial driver of ﬁrm performance and,
in turn, international location decisions (Driffield,
Jones and Crotty, 2013). Cuervo-Cazurra and
Ramamurti (2014) extend this by arguing that
institutional quality at home, within the context of
emerging market multinationals, is an important
driver of internationalization, as ﬁrms seek to
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‘escape’ poor institutional quality. However, such
analysis tends to rely on cross-country assessments
of institutional quality in order to construct an in-
dex, which can then be used to explain the location
decision.We seek, through a unique lens, to extend
this literature in examining the role of a speciﬁc
institutional intervention – the imposition of a
smoking ban – and its impact on the internation-
alization of tobacco ﬁrms. Our point of interest is
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the tobacco sec-
tor, which is to say, at the ﬁrm level, the acquisition
or creation of income-generating assets by a ﬁrm
resident in one country, but investing abroad.1
In itself, the continuing regulation and gov-
ernment intervention in this sector has received
widespread comment over a number of years,
and from a variety of perspectives. The exposure
of second-hand smoke on public health has
become a major policy concern for health officials
across the world. The World Health Organization
1See, for example, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/
investmentstatisticsandanalysis/40193734.pdf
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estimates that over six million people a year die
from smoking-related illnesses, and emphasize the
role that government interventions can play in
countering this.2 Consequently, governments have
introduced rules, regulations and laws banning
smoking in various public places. Not without
controversy, further impetus was given in 2003,
when theWorldHealth Organization’s Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) com-
pelled signatories to enact further comprehensive
smoking bans. By 2012, 176 countries had become
party to the convention.
Typically, this literature has relied on cross-
country estimates of institutions or other cultural
or geographic phenomena. As Teegan (2003)
points out, most institutions are national, and
provide the setting by which private agents in-
teract. Our approach therefore seeks to extend
understanding of the importance of regulation
within the tobacco industry. We use an identiﬁer
of variation in national governance structures –
the existence, or otherwise, of a smoking ban – and
employ this, alongside the imposition of excise
duty, in the context of a set of ﬁrms in a relatively
homogeneous industry. Focusing on a speciﬁc
sector, we seek to develop the literature on insti-
tutions developed from North (1990) and applied
to ﬁrm internationalization (Hutzschenreuter,
Kleindienst and Lange, 2014).
The tobacco industry and its location decisions
offer a particularly interesting subject in this con-
text. The industry is subject to a wide range and
ever tightening set of regulatory and policy con-
trols, from trade restrictions and anti-smuggling
interventions that also hinder intra-ﬁrm trade
(Gillespie, 2003), advertising bans (Saffer and
Chaloupka, 2000), sales restrictions (Stead and
Lancaster, 2008) and, more recently, smoking bans
in public places (Longo et al., 2001). Indeed, there
has been an assertion for some time that tobacco
ﬁrms are responding to smoking bans and a more
general decline in sales in their traditional devel-
oped country markets by seeking new markets
in the developing world (Gilmore and McKee,
2004). Equally, informal institutions, voluntary
codes and the ethics of the industry have always
taken second place to economic considerations,
including tax revenues, and it is only recently that
formal institutions have had a signiﬁcant impact
2http://www.who.int/gho/tobacco/en/
in the form of the banning of smoking in public
places.3 Thus our analysis builds on Hillier et al.
(2011) and sees smoking bans as the key insti-
tution in this sector that varies across countries,
in terms of both legislation and enforcement.
Further, we compare the imposition of a smok-
ing ban with the imposition of excise duties on
tobacco, in exploring the impact of the two main
interventions designed to deter smoking. Within
the context of IB, the industry offers an additional
advantage in terms of isolating the effects of
intervention on internationalization. The growing
of tobacco typically occurs outside the large ﬁrms,
who have no need to engage in resource-seeking
FDI.4 Traditionally, international production
has been strongly linked to local sales and local
branding, with very low levels of what might be
termed efficiency-seeking FDI. As such, FDI in
this sector is of a market-seeking nature.
Where IB theory has been applied to problems
such as this, the analysis has essentially applied
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm to the issue of how
best to lever ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages (FSAs),
such as a brand or a particular technology,
into new markets. It is likely that one would
simply observe exporting behaviour, followed
by market-seeking FDI, once potential foreign
sales reach a given scale. However, we argue that
government intervention in this industry may
be so pervasive, and (for very good reasons) so
signiﬁcant to the operations of the ﬁrm, that the
lack of institutional intervention (i.e. the lack of
a smoking ban) in the ﬁrm’s home market equates
to a source of country-speciﬁc advantage (CSA)
over ﬁrms from other countries with high degrees
of regulation or intervention. We therefore seek to
link our ﬁrm-level measures of ﬁrm performance,
which are hypothesized to be positively related to
internationalization, to interventions designed to
inhibit ﬁrm performance.
In order to investigate this phenomenon, we
use a database that allows us not only to identify
all instances of FDI in this sector for the period
3For an example of recent deliberations on this, see
details of the World Health Organization meeting
in October 2014, available at: http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/news/releases/2014/cop6-tobacco-control/en/.
4See for example http://www.bat.com/farmers who state
that they purchase from over one hundred thousand
contracted farmers, or http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_
statistics/fact_sheets/economics/econ_facts/ who outline
the structure of the industry in the US.
© 2016 British Academy of Management.
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1997–2009, but also directly to link parent and
subsidiary information at the ﬁrm level. The major
insight of this paper is that smoking bans, rather
than prompting the relocation of ﬁrms, act as an
institutional constraint on internationalization.
It would appear therefore that FDI in this sector
appears to be more prevalent from countries
without smoking bans. Thus, smoking bans at
home can be seen as a major source of CSA that
impacts upon ﬁrm strategy.
While we argue, therefore, that regulation, or in
this case the lack of it, can be a source of CSA for
ﬁrms in this sector, we extend our analysis further.
We go on to argue that the host and home dimen-
sions interact with each other. Contrary to the
common conception, which has argued that ﬁrms
go abroad as the demand for tobacco at home
declines, our results suggest that tobacco ﬁrms are
more likely to invest in countries without a smok-
ing ban if there is a lack of a smoking ban at home.
This, we attribute to the impact that a smoking
ban has on the resources available to facilitate
internationalization. We subsequently explore this
in terms of the interactions between FSAs and
CSAs, both at home and abroad, that drive inter-
nationalization. Following this we go on to discuss
the policy aspects of our ﬁndings within the domi-
nant IB frameworks. Given the fact that a majority
of countries without tobacco controls tend to have
low levels of human development (see Appendix
A1), this has severe ramiﬁcations for health-care
policy in the poorest parts of the world. It is
notable, for example, that India recently banned
FDI in the tobacco sector, and there is pressure for
governments in developing countries to provide
better education on the health risks associated
with smoking, andmore regulation on advertising.
This paper proceeds as follows. The second section
introduces the theoretical framework on which
this study is based, linking the theoretical basis of
studies on FDI with our other theoretical lens of
institutional theory. The third section develops the
empirical model, and presents the data. The re-
maining sections are devoted to a discussion of the
results and the conclusion, which discusses policy.
Theoretical framework
The stylized literature on FDI by multinational
enterprises (MNEs) has as its basis the ownership–
location–internalization (OLI) framework of
Dunning (1979, 1988). The basic proposition of
the OLI framework continues to be valid in the
sense that MNEs expand into other countries and
continents to take advantage of local resources
and by leveraging their own unique capabilities
(Luo and Tung, 2007). Rugman (1981, 1985,
2005) divides the three components of the Eclectic
Paradigm into FSAs and CSAs. Our approach is
to analyse the changes in international production
in the tobacco industry, using the FSA/CSA
framework of Rugman (1981), which Rugman
(2010) juxtaposes with the OLI approach of
Dunning (1979) in terms of exploring FDI in the
CSA/FSA setting from the perspective of the host
country as well as the source country.
Rugman (2010) builds on the overlap between
FSA and the desire of the ﬁrm to internalize its
internationalization strategy, based on transaction
cost considerations, by considering what he terms
‘Hymer-type’ advantages (Hymer, 1960) or, in this
context, Dunning’s ownership advantage. These
are the FSAs that exist at the ﬁrm level and, in
our setting, facilitate internationalization, through
brands, marketing expertise and, potentially, prod-
uct quality. This ﬁrm-level analysis then has to be
mapped onto the CSA/FSAmatrix, with respect to
the home and host countries (Rugman, 2010).5
Of perhaps more relevance to the issue at hand
here is the interaction between location advantage
and Rugman’s use of the term CSA. Extending
Rugman’s (2010) analysis to the home country,
we argue that the imposition of a smoking ban
is a key deterrent to FDI in this sector from the
perspective of the host country, but equally acts to
reduce the likelihood of FDI from the perspective
of the home country. This therefore builds on the
related analysis of Hennart (2009), who extends
the traditional internalization analysis to the
interaction between not only the ﬁrm’s FSAs,
but also the complementary resources available
to the ﬁrm from both its home and potential
host location. Within the context of the tobacco
industry, we see intervention at home, and abroad,
as crucial resources for the ﬁrm, interacted, as
Hennart (2009) suggests, with their own FSAs.
5This is a similar approach to that which explores the
distinction between emerging market multinationals and
MNEs from the west, with FDI by the latter explained
by home country CSAs rather than FSAs in the form of
ownership advantages; see, for example, Cuervo-Cazurra
and Ramamurti (2014).
© 2016 British Academy of Management.
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Regulation and country-speciﬁc disadvantage
The analysis that we apply here is the standard
approach to CSA and FSA (Rugman, 1981).
Country-speciﬁc advantage is typically analysed
in terms of market efficiency, institutions, quality
of goods and capital markets, and resources
including natural resources and labour. In this
context, institutional quality is seen as a key
CSA, facilitating transactions and reducing risk
(Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009). Our key institu-
tion here is the attitude of government and society
to tobacco, expressed through both formal and
informal institutions, and the extent to which this
can affect location choice. Abdi and Aulakh (2012)
summarize the problem elegantly, arguing that
ﬁrms interact with their institutional environment
through norms that are established on the basis
of how well ﬁrms understand their environment
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Xu and Shenkar,
2002).
We argue that, in this setting, the lack of a
smoking ban in a ﬁrm’s home country provides
what may be termed a CSA for tobacco ﬁrms,
to facilitate and ﬁnance international expansion
through FDI. Because the imposition of a smok-
ing ban runs counter to the interests of the tobacco
industry, it acts as an important institutional con-
straint on ﬁrm behaviour. It can therefore be seen
as a source of home-country-speciﬁc disadvan-
tage. This regulation or intervention impinges to
such an extent on the market-seeking motivation
for ﬁrms to internationalize, perhaps through a
combination of reduced resources to fund FDI,
but perhaps also the fear of adverse criticism
(Neville, Bell and Menguc, 2005), that the propen-
sity to internationalize is reduced. Here, one can
view the institutional intervention (the ban) as
a proxy for a more general anti-smoking stance
among at least a signiﬁcant proportion of the
population (if smoking bans were too politically
unpopular they would not be introduced). Thus,
as well as impacting directly on the consumption
of the product, smoking bans can also be seen as
indicators of more long-term changes in demand.
Additionally, one can also consider the impo-
sition of excise duty in a similar vein. Excise taxes
have historically been the most common weapon
used by governments in developed economies to
combat cigarette consumption. Standard Ramsey
rule tax analysis suggests that goods with a low
elasticity of demand should be taxed due to the
minimal impact upon production and consump-
tion. Tobacco is an addictive product, and the user
response to a price change is likely to be minimal.
In this case, although governments may wish to
reduce tobacco consumption to alleviate health
pressures, they also get the added beneﬁt of raising
revenue. In contrast, a tobacco ban has an impact
only on the former, in direct contrast to the latter.
This suggests that, although tobacco bans and the
use of excise taxes may be seen in a similar light,
the effect of a ban is potentially more direct.
Additionally, smoking bans can also be viewed
as an indicator of public opinion regarding the
health and ethical issues around smoking. This is
important in this context, because institutions re-
fer not only to legal entities, but to the embedded-
ness of cultural norms and informal institutions.
As such, while ﬁrms whose home country has
implemented smoking bans may seek new outlets
in countries without bans, they are more likely to
face criticism at home (Neville, Bell and Menguc,
2005). This leads to our ﬁrst hypothesis:
H1: Interventions to reduce smoking at home
are a source of country-speciﬁc disadvantage,
leading to a reduction in the propensity of such
ﬁrms to engage in FDI.
Building upon this hypothesis, our analysis then
turns to exploring the location of FDI, and the im-
portance of government intervention in themarket
at home. The evidence suggests that developing
countries or those with low human development
are less likely to have smoking bans, and much
less likely to enforce them than richer countries,
presenting an opportunity for tobacco ﬁrms. The
list of potential host countries without smoking
bans in 2009 includes much of Africa, South East
Asia and the former Soviet Union (see Appendix
A1). These are mainly developing countries where
the health risks associated with smoking are less
widely known.6 Equally, tobacco markets in these
countries are characterized by low levels of en-
forcement on controls, such as the sale of cigarettes
to minors (Frieden, 2005). Market-seeking FDI in
this sector may therefore be drawn to such loca-
tions, and one could employ an argument similar
to that concerning environmental regulation, that
developing countries’ governments may be less
6For further discussion on these issues, see World Health
Organization (2003).
© 2016 British Academy of Management.
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selective in terms of the type of FDI they can at-
tract, welcoming the employment and investment.
One can reﬁne this argument further by building
on the importance of institutions and interven-
tions. Drawing on Williamson (2000), we view
institutions as a hierarchy ordered according to
the frequency of change and the corresponding
degree of applicability of economizing behaviour.
Both public governance frameworks and private
governance structures affect the decisions of
economic actors most directly, including ﬁrms’
choices over resource allocation, which also result
in performance outcomes.
We argue that smoking controls represent an
important institutional construct that, in turn,
is directly targeted at reducing the demand for
the product and therefore, in turn, designed to
have an impact on ﬁrm performance. This offers
a solution to one of the ambiguities identiﬁed
by Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau (2009), in that the
broader measures of institutional quality can
represent composite effects with opposite signs.7
Smoking bans arise through the democratic
process; they are often in manifestos at elections,
or subject to referenda. As such, smoking bans
are not merely indicative of social norms in a
country, but their enforcement is also an indicator
of institutional and regulatory quality. Smoking
bans are therefore an indication of public opinion
regarding the health and ethical issues around
smoking. This is important in this context, be-
cause institutions refer not only to legal entities,
but to embeddedness of cultural norms and
informal institutions (Wildavsky, 1987). As such,
smoking bans, and the extent to which they are
adhered to, are not merely legal entities, but reﬂect
much wider social norms. In turn, embeddedness
affects the formal constitutional rules: these reﬂect
general criteria according to which the legal order
is built, especially determining how the given
systems score along the scale deﬁned by the rule of
law. As such, while ﬁrms whose home country has
implemented smoking bans may seek new outlets
in countries without bans, they are more likely to
7Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau (2009) cite, for example, im-
provements in competition policy. On the one hand, they
may be expected to improve market efficiency and there-
fore ﬁrm performance, through amore efficient allocation
of resources. On the other hand, this is likely to cause a re-
duction in performance of hitherto dominant ﬁrms.
face criticism at home, especially if they seek to
exploit markets in developing countries.
This suggests that not only will ﬁrms who are
located in countries without tobacco bans have a
greater propensity to do FDI, but they are also
more likely to be attracted to countries that them-
selves lack tobacco controls. This leads to our
second hypothesis:
H2: Firms from countries without smoking bans
are more likely to engage in FDI in countries
without smoking bans.
Firm-speciﬁc advantages and internationalization
Thus far, we have explored institutions as sources
of CSA, from the perspective of both host and
home countries. We now turn our attention to the
importance of FSAs in explaining this relation-
ship. The key indicators of FSA in this context are
a vector of variables, encompassing both the abil-
ity of the ﬁrm to internationalize, in terms of what
Rugman refers to as ‘Hymer advantages’, and the
ability to ﬁnance such internationalization. Our
initial focus, therefore, is on a ﬁrm sales, cash ﬂow
and intangible assets. These are therefore collected
from the data. In addition, to capture the impor-
tance of managerial assets, Johnson, Schnatterly
and Hill (2013) and Lester et al. (2008), for ex-
ample, consider board size, within applications of
the knowledge capital model. They argue that, in-
dependent of ﬁrm size, board size is a proxy for
managerial capacity and combined experience. As
such, it is positively associated with the ability to
coordinate international activities and to carry out
successful FDI projects.
The location for activity is most likely to be
in developing countries with low human devel-
opment and weak institutions. Because of this,
knowledge capital is of increasing importance,
and this resource base can be obtained by a
well-stocked board of directors and non-executive
directors potentially with political connections.
Here, we borrow from the resource-based view of
the ﬁrm (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) and argue
that boards of directors constitute key knowledge
capital for the ﬁrm and, as such, increase both
the drive for internationalization, and also the
capacity to carry it out successfully (Calabro et al.,
2013). This is a similar argument to that made in
the context of the knowledge capital model of the
ﬁrm, that a signiﬁcant constraint on ﬁrm devel-
opment and internationalization is human capital
© 2016 British Academy of Management.
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and management experience at the strategic level
of the company, with director-level resources being
a key driver of this. Extending this, from a com-
pany corporate social responsibility (CSR) per-
spective, a large number of directors aremore likely
to push the ﬁrm’s strategy towards the ﬁrm’s core
economic responsibilities (Carroll, 1979, 1991),
rather than focus on its social objectives. Thus, this
knowledge capital not only adds to the FSA, facili-
tating FDI, but also reinforces the ﬁrm’s economic
responsibilities. This leads to our ﬁnal hypothesis:
H3: FSAs remain key drivers of international-
ization in the tobacco industry, even where insti-
tutions and regulation dominates in the sector.
Empirical model
We begin our analysis with a model that anal-
yses the tobacco ﬁrm’s FDI decision. Building
on Driffield, Jones and Crotty (2013), theoreti-
cally the probability of a ﬁrm entering a loca-
tion is determined by expectations of future proﬁts
(e). In equation (1), T is the expected life of the
investment, and r is the discount rate.
Prob (FDI) = φ1
[∑T
p=0(1/1 + r )
pet+p
]
(1)
This is clearly unobservable, but this model can
be rewritten as a function of a vector of ﬁrm and
home country characteristics such that
∑T
p=0(1/1 + r)
pet+p = (φi j , θ j ) (2)
where φi j is a vector of ﬁrm-level effects, and θ j is
a vector of home country effects (home-country-
speciﬁc disadvantage). In this paper, the home
country effect is simply whether the parent ﬁrm’s
country of origin has smoking ban legislation. The
appropriate estimation technique used is a pro-
bit model. Probit models are ideal for studying
data with an independent variable that is binomi-
ally distributed. One can express probit models in
terms of the event probability.
Prob (FDI = 1) =
x′β∫
−∞
φ(t)dt = (x′β) (3)
where  is the standard normal cumulative distri-
bution function. The probit model is essentially a
linear regression of the Z score of the event prob-
ability on the dependent variable (FDI). To inter-
pret the coefficient estimates, therefore, researchers
generally look at the estimated signs of the regres-
sion coefficients or calculate the marginal effects.8
Equation (3) translates into equation (4) a model
that seeks to explain variations in the propensity of
ﬁrms to engage in FDI.
FDIit = β0 + β1Sales + β2Sales2 + β3Age
+β2Age2 + β3 f reecash f low
+
3∑
j=1
δ j FSAjit
+ θkTobacco Regulationkit + eit (4)
where FDIit by ﬁrm i at time t equals 1 if a to-
bacco company undertakes FDI in time t.9 The
model allows us to test our theoretical hypothe-
ses based on Rugman’s (1981) FSA/CSA matrix.
The variable Tobacco Regulation, k = 1, 2, is our
institutional measure and is either: (1) the impo-
sition of a smoking ban (No_Ban_Home); or (2)
a proxy for the home excise duty rate (Tobacco
Tax). The former is a dummy variable that equals
1 if a ﬁrm’s home country of origin has no smok-
ing ban legislation, while the latter is measured
as a percentage. We can therefore formally test
Hypothesis 1. By observing a positive coefficient
for θ1 when No_Ban_Home is included, we can
say that smoking bans at home act as a country-
speciﬁc institutional constraint on the ﬁrm’s inter-
nationalization strategy. Conversely, if we include
the tobacco tax instead of the dummy, a negative
coefficient for θ2 suggests that higher excise duties
also act as an important institutional constraint.
As controls, we also include variables that
typically operationalize internationalization the-
ory (see Bhaumik, Driffield and Pal, 2010). By
including Sales and Sales2, we can determine
whether FDI is driven by a non-linear relationship
in ﬁrm size, such that the largest ﬁrms do FDI. In
addition, ﬁrm age has often been linked to FDI
propensity (Driffield, Jones and Crotty, 2013),
though here it may also capture the fact that
more established ﬁrms are more entrenched in the
tobacco industry, with higher sunk costs and is
8For more information on probit models, see Liao (1994).
9FDI is observed if the tobacco ﬁrm has overseas
subsidiaries.
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therefore more likely to seek new markets through
FDI. Furthermore, we also include Free Cash
Flow, following Baker, Foley and Wurgler (2008).
This is deﬁned as the cash ﬂow available to the
ﬁrm after its commitments needed to maintain its
existing asset base.
In order to test Hypothesis 3, the vector FSA
includes a measure of embedded knowledge (the
ratio of intangible assets to total assets of the
ﬁrm). This measure is that typically employed with
ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial data (see, for example, Brauner-
hjelm, 1996; Driffield, Jones and Crotty, 2013) as
a measure of technological or marketing-based
FSA.10 Finally, we also includemeasures ofKnowl-
edge Capital in this vector: (1) the number of di-
rectors as a measure of managerial resources and
(2) the concentration of ownership (Herﬁndahl).
The inclusion of the number of directors has been
linked to FDI in terms of their providing more ex-
pertise, especially in terms of developing new mar-
kets, while Bhaumik, Driffield and Pal (2010) link
ownership concentration to FDI decisions, and
Driffield, Jones and Crotty (2013) to controversial
or risky foreign investments.
We then augment the model in order to test Hy-
pothesis 2 by examining speciﬁcally the propensity
of ﬁrms to invest in countries without a smoking
ban. This involves replicating equation (4), but
with the dependent variable redeﬁned to include
positive observations (coded 1) when ﬁrms un-
dertake FDI in a country without a smoking
ban. We therefore rename the dependent variable
‘FDI in No Ban’. This means that an estimated
positive coefficient for β1 (i.e. when we include
the No_Ban_Home dummy) suggests that tobacco
ﬁrms from countries without smoking bans
are more likely to do FDI in countries without
smoking bans.
Data
The data consist of the population of tobacco
ﬁrms or ﬁrms who report tobacco as a signiﬁcant
activity in the ORBIS ﬁrm-level data set provided
by Bureau van Dijk. This provides information
on 141 ﬁrms, 53 of whom engage in FDI, and
26 who invest in countries without a smoking
ban. Thus, we have an unbalanced panel of ﬁrms
10Intangible assets include the valuations of brands, trade-
marks, amortized R&D and patents.
consisting of 912 observations across the time
period 1997–2009. Descriptive statistics and the
correlation matrix for each variable are provided
in Appendixes A2 andA4. All monetary values are
deﬂated to remove inﬂation, and logarithms are
taken so that the estimated coefficients are elastic-
ities. In order to create a variable that captures the
concentration of ownership, we download each
shareholder’s percentage of ownership and then
construct a Herﬁndahl index using the sum of
squared ownership shares.11
We identify FDI if a ﬁrm has at least a 10% own-
ership stake in an overseas subsidiary, involved in
the production or distribution of tobacco. This we
see as a proxy for market-seeking FDI, the desire
to ‘get nearer to the customer’. Therefore, for the
ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the dependent variable (FDI) is
a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm has a subsidiary
abroad and 0 otherwise. For the second speciﬁ-
cation, the dependent variable (FDI in No Ban) is
again a dummy and equals 1 if the ﬁrm has at least
one subsidiary in a country without a smoking
ban and 0 otherwise. Finally, the variable used to
test hypotheses Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2
(No_Ban_Home) is a dummy variable that equals
1 if a ﬁrm’s country of origin is in a location
without a smoking ban and 0 otherwise.
Data on smoking bans and tobacco taxes
The data on smoking bans are obtained from
chartsbin.com, which constructs an index from the
World Health Organization (2008) and from the
American Cancer Society and World Lung Foun-
dation (2009).12 Chartsbin.com classiﬁes countries
according to six categories, as deﬁned in Table 1.
In order to construct the dummy variables
outlined above, we combine deﬁnitions 1–5 and
classify those ﬁrms as coming from countries
with smoking ban legislation, whereas ﬁrms from
countries that fulﬁl the sixth deﬁnition are those
from ‘no ban’ countries. Additionally, we use
exactly the same approach in order to deter-
mine whether a ﬁrm’s subsidiaries are located in
countries without smoking bans. Appendix A1
11The Herﬁndahl of ownership concentration is the sum
of each shareholder’s ownership percentage squared. We
normalize this measure so that it lies between 0 and 1 with
1 representing a ﬁrm with a sole owner.
12The ChartsBin collector team also use the following
source for the Kazakh data: AFP (2009).
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Table 1. Deﬁning smoking bans
Ban type Deﬁnition
1. Complete ban Smoke-free legislation covering all types of places and institutions.
2. Strong ban Smoke-free legislation covering health-care and educational facilities, but with
limited exceptions.
3. Moderate ban Smoke-free legislation covering health-care and educational facilities, as well
as 3, 4 or 5 other places and institutions.
4. Minimal ban Smoke-free legislation covering health-care and educational facilities, as well
as 1 or 2 other places and institutions.
5. Comprehensive local legislation Smoke-free legislation at a sub-national level.
6. No ban Complete absence of smoke-free legislation, or absence of smoke-free
legislation covering either health-care or educational facilities.
Table 2. Parent ﬁrm location and country’s smoking ban status
Parent country Number of Percentage of Country’s ban Most sold brand
of origin ﬁrms sample status in 2009† of cigarettes –
taxes as a % of
price (2008)††
Belgium 6 4.26 Moderate ban 77.43
Bulgaria 19 13.48 Minimal ban 85.44
China 24 17.02 No ban 36.18
Croatia 3 2.13 No ban 60.70
Czech Republic 3 2.13 No ban 82.83
France 2 1.42 Strong ban 80.39
Germany 17 12.06 Local legislation 75.78
Greece 11 7.8 No ban 73.47
India 2 1.42 Local legislation 46.20
Italy 11 7.8 Strong ban 75.17
Japan 1 0.71 No ban 63.06
Jordan 1 0.71 Minimal ban 77.20
Netherlands 6 4.26 Strong ban 73.67
Poland 9 6.38 No ban 93.84
Portugal 2 1.42 Moderate ban 79.60
Romania 1 0.71 Moderate ban 72.37
Spain 11 7.8 Moderate ban 77.35
Sweden 3 2.13 Strong ban 71.85
UK 2 1.42 Complete ban 76.57
USA 7 4.96 Local legislation 36.57
Total 141 100
†Source: ChartsBin Statistics Collector Team (2009).
†† Source: World Health Organization.
identiﬁes 93 countries in the world that, according
to chartsbin.com in 2009, had no smoking bans.13
For convenience, we include the 2009 Human
Development Index ranking for each country, and
it is clear that the majority of countries have low
or medium human development.
Additional details about the data can be seen in
Table 2, which describes parent ﬁrm coverage. As
13We acknowledge that, during and after 2009, tobacco
controls were being introduced in a number of countries
that are classiﬁed as countries without a smoking ban, e.g.
Denmark.
can be seen, the 141 parent ﬁrms span 20 coun-
tries. Out of these 20 countries six had an absence
of smoking bans in 2009: (1) China; (2) Croatia;
(3) Czech Republic; (4) Greece; (5) Japan; and
(6) Poland. In total, 24 ﬁrms come from China,
19 are from Bulgaria, and 17 are from Germany,
whereas 7 come from the USA and 2 come from
the UK. Interestingly, none of the parent ﬁrms are
located in a country that is classiﬁed by the United
Nations as having low human development. The
data also include the world’s largest international
tobacco ﬁrms: China National Tobacco; Philip
Morris International Inc.; Japan Tobacco Inter-
© 2016 British Academy of Management.
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national; British American Tobacco; and Impe-
rial TobaccoGroup. Unsurprisingly, all these ﬁrms
have subsidiaries in ‘no ban’ countries.
The data on Excise duties14 is obtained from
the World Health Organization and is equal to
the tax on the most sold brand of cigarettes as a
percentage of prices in 2008. Table 2 reports the
data for the home countries included in our analy-
sis. It shows that there is some evidence to suggest
that low tax rates are associated with limited ban
legislation, but this is not always the case. Both
Poland and the Czech Republic had minimal ban
legislation in 2009, but very high excise tax rates.
Results
The results for the baseline are presented in
Table 3. Here the dependent variable is the FDI
variable discussed above. This model works well,
with a high proportion of correct predictions, with
no bias in the number of type one or type two
errors. This overall conﬁrms our approach based
on Rugman’s FSA/CSA matrix.
We ﬁnd clear support for Hypothesis 1, in that
interventions designed to reduce smoking also re-
duce the likelihood of FDI. Firms from countries
without a smoking ban are 7.6% more likely to
carry out FDI. This suggests that the lack of a
smoking ban at home is more likely to drive FDI,
such that, in this sector, the lack of a smoking ban
can be seen as a country-speciﬁc asset. In addition,
the coefficient for the excise duty is negative again,
indicating that intervention mitigates internation-
alization, though the effect is much weaker. Even a
doubling of excise duty would only lead to a reduc-
tion in the propensity to internationalize of 0.2%.
There is clear support for Hypothesis 3 in line
with the large literature that seeks to model FDI
ﬂows with reference to either the knowledge capi-
tal model, or the resource-based view of the ﬁrm.
Managerial capacity is positively associated with
FDI, as are sales and, in most cases, cash ﬂow. The
other ﬁrm-level variables including sales and age
are also linked to greater FDI intensity. In all cases,
while the coefficients on sales and sales-squared
point to a non-linear relationship between size and
internationalization, the turning points are around
the 15th percentile in the distribution, such that for
most ﬁrms the probability of internationalization
14See http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.TOB_32800
Table 3. FDI decision (marginal effects)
Variables FDI FDI
ln Sales −0.291*** −0.286***
(0.0606) (0.0598)
ln Sales² 0.0206*** 0.0201***
(0.00339) (0.00336)
ln Cash ﬂow 0.00141 0.00207
(0.00541) (0.00552)
Intangible/Total Assets −0.0629 −0.241
(0.379) (0.382)
Age 0.00348*** 0.00407***
(0.00115) (0.00120)
Age² −2.30e–05*** −2.65e–05***
(6.08e–06) (6.37e–06)
Number of Directors 0.0195*** 0.0204***
(0.00398) (0.00399)
Herﬁndahl −0.0303 −0.00461
(0.0567) (0.0584)
No_Ban_Home 0.0759*
(0.0400)
Tobacco Tax −0.00261*
(0.00134)
Observations 912 912
LR (9) 313.818 314.001
Prob> LR 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R² 0.2505 0.2506
Correct predictions 76.75 76.86
Smith–Blundell (χ ²) 0.0298 0.1382
p−value 0.8629 0.7100
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p<0.01; *p<0.1
19
The Smith–Blundell statistic reports the appropriate test for
endogeneity.
20
increases with ﬁrm size. Interestingly, the lower
the value of free cash, after controlling for size,
the greater the propensity for ﬁrms to engage in
FDI. This is strongly suggestive of market-seeking
FDI, as ﬁrms seek to bolster falling net revenue by
seeking new markets.
Typically, the literature that focuses on what
may be termed controversial investments ﬁnds a
positive effect of ownership concentration. Here,
however, such investment represents the core
business for the ﬁrm, as opposed to more periph-
eral decisions of whether to choose between two
locations, or whether to diversify into potentially
proﬁtable but perhaps socially unpopular activi-
ties. Interestingly therefore, dispersed ownership
does not inﬂuence what in other circumstances
may be considered a controversial investment or
attract adverse comment in the press.15
15In practice, such moderating effects occur through pres-
sure groups or activists purchasing shares in such compa-
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Table 4. The decision to invest in locations without smoking bans
(marginal effects)
Variables FDI in no ban FDI in no ban
ln Sales −0.267*** −0.201***
(0.0461) (0.0453)
ln Sales² 0.0185*** 0.0148***
(0.00279) (0.00256)
ln Cash ﬂow −0.00859** −0.0155***
(0.00396) (0.00441)
Intangible/Total Assets 0.330 −0.0294
(0.258) (0.262)
Age 0.00262*** 0.00241**
(0.000788) (0.000968)
Age² −2.21e–05*** −2.89e–05***
(3.82e–06) (6.58e–06)
Number of Directors 0.00535** 0.00890***
(0.00222) (0.00296)
Herﬁndahl 0.0195 −0.0160
(0.0321) (0.0366)
No_Ban_Home 0.536***
(0.0434)
Tobacco Tax −0.00274**
(0.00107)
Observations 912 912
LR (9) 491.937 312.297
Prob> LR 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R² 0.5100 0.3238
Correct predictions 87.39% 83.22%
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Turning now to Hypothesis 2, this requires a
more ﬁnely grained analysis concerning FDI in
‘no ban’ countries. The most striking result in
Table 4 is the conﬁrmation of Hypothesis 2 that
ﬁrms from countries without a smoking ban are
more likely to invest in other non-ban countries.
The marginal effect of 0.536 suggests that the
magnitude of this is over 50%. This provides clear
evidence that ‘institutions matter’; where a ban
does not exist in the home country, ﬁrms are more
likely to engage in FDI to other countries without
a smoking ban. Despite pressure from falling
receipts in countries with smoking bans, it is not
tobacco ﬁrms from ban countries that are taking
the lead in FDI in non-ban countries to meet their
economic responsibilities (Carroll, 1979, 1991).
This suggests that viewing FDI in the tobacco
industry through the lens of institution theory is
correct. The prevailing national norms and values
nies in order to pressure managers into certain decisions.
We know of no examples of, for example, cancer or health
charities investing in tobacco ﬁrms.
vis-a`-vis tobacco within the host country, proxied
here via smoking bans, do appear to constrain the
FDI activity of tobacco ﬁrms and thus act as a
source of country-speciﬁc disadvantage. Thus, na-
tional policy appears to have made ﬁrms situated
in countries with smoking bans better corporate
citizens (Carroll, 1998). Over time, therefore,
ﬁrms from countries without a smoking ban will
become more important, especially in the develop-
ing world, as countries from the developing world
are less likely to introduce smoking bans.
Interestingly, the effect of increasing excise
duty has a similar, but smaller effect, in that
counties with higher excise duty (and therefore
greater discouragement for smoking), have lower
incidence of outward FDI in this sector. Taken
together, in conjunction with the effect of sales,
the results suggest that in countries where the
demand for tobacco is falling, a smoking ban
hastens this process, and reduces still further
the capacity of ﬁrms from that country to carry
out FDI. Alternatively, where a ﬁrm’s demand is
increasing, a ban dampens the extent to which this
growth leads to internationalization.
Robustness checks
As a robustness check, we also estimated themodel
using not sales, but the change in sales, to allow for
a reduction in sales in this setting to drive interna-
tionalization. The results are suggestive of this, and
all other ﬁndings are robust to this speciﬁcation,
reported in Appendix A3.
In addition, we were concerned that one could
argue that smoking bans are potentially endoge-
nously derived within a model of internationaliza-
tion. For example, one may argue that a large ﬁrm,
potentially employing a large number of people in
a less well-off region, may threaten to go offshore if
a ban comes in, and therefore be able to prevent a
ban from being introduced. We therefore test this
using a standard test for endogeneity and report
the result in Table 3.16
16The Smith–Blundell test is a likelihood ratio test for en-
dogeneity. As with all such tests, the key problem is to
ﬁnd an instrument, in our case something that is corre-
lated with the potential smoking ban, but not correlated
with internationalization. We used various institutional
measures, such as corruption, law and order and employ-
ment at home (on the basis that the more employment a
ﬁrm has had at home, the more lobby power it may have).
In all cases, we do not reject the null hypothesis of the
© 2016 British Academy of Management.
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Conclusion
The World Health Organization estimates that
over six million people every year die from
smoking-related illnesses. These ﬁgures are falling
in the developed world, but continue to rise in
developing countries. Our results highlight the
role that smoking bans in developed countries can
play in seeking to reduce these ﬁgures. Equally, in
2015, when the UK government announced the
intention to move to plain packaging for tobacco,
independent estimates placed the value of the
intellectual property associated with the main UK
brands at £20 billion.17 This emphasizes, albeit
in an atypical industry, the impact that taxation,
interventions and institutional quality can have
on ﬁrm performance and internationalization.
Taken together, our results highlight both some
speciﬁc policy aspects of the regulation of the
global tobacco industry, as well as some more
general points for the study of IB: ﬁrst, that the im-
position of a smoking ban acts as an institutional
constraint on a tobacco ﬁrm’s internationalization
strategy, thus acting as a source of country-speciﬁc
disadvantage. Several international bodies such
as the World Health Organization, UNCTAD
and UNIDO are concerned with the proliferation
of the tobacco industry internationally, and our
results highlight the role that domestic policy can
have in reducing this. Hitherto, it has been sug-
gested that ﬁrst-world smoking bans are essentially
unilateral actions that will lead to international-
ization of ﬁrms, but our results show that this is
not the case. Rather, our analysis links host and
home country institutions, ﬁrm-level governance
and ownership structures, and CSR through the
matrix of FSA/CSA to ﬁrm-level FDI decisions.
Focusing on the tobacco industry, we have
shown that the domestic regulatory stance taken
by governments to dissuade people from smoking
(and thus cut health-care costs) does have an
impact on ﬁrm-level behaviour. Smoking ban
legislation is an institutional factor affecting and
shaping consumption within the tobacco industry,
ban variable being exogenous. The result reported relates
to the use of law and order as an instrument, which gen-
erated the lowest p value.
17The Independent, 22 May 2015. Available at: http://
www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/
health-news/tobacco-companies-ﬁle-lawsuits-against-uk-
government-over-plain-packaging-laws-10270874.html
and having a direct impact on internationalization.
Further, it is clear that ﬁrms without a smoking
ban at home are growing more important, and
are expanding into developing countries or those
countries with low human development.
We are subsequently able to show that ﬁrms who
invest in non-ban countries are also more likely to
invest in developing countries. This suggests that
institutions seeking to inﬂuence national CSR
(proxied by smoking bans) signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
FDI decisions and location decisions. Our ﬁndings
indicate the need for further research linking FDI,
not merely in controversial sectors, but in con-
troversial circumstances, to both local and global
debates concerning governance and regulation.
Limitations
The ﬁrst question that we must address is the
extent to which one can generalize from analysis
based on what might be considered an atypical
industry. For example, western models of gover-
nance rely on dispersed ownership and the roles
of non-executive directors to mitigate extreme
behaviour. Such a model does not apply here.
Directors emphasize economic over moral or
ethical responsibilities (Carroll, 1979, 1991) and
ownership concentration is seemingly irrelevant.
In terms of internationalization, while, as we
explain above, it is reasonable to assume that FDI
in this sector is for market-seeking reasons rather
than resource-seeking or efficiency-seeking. We
have, however, inferred that, from the nature of
the sector, and the apparent activities based on
industry classiﬁcation codes of affiliates, rather
than observing this directly.
Thirdly, export information at the ﬁrm level
is patchy. There is no obligation within many
countries’ ﬁnancial reporting rules to report
exports, and none does so by location.18 As such,
we examine only one part of the international-
ization decision. Finally, there is a trade-off here
between data quality and coverage. For the large
western ﬁrms, we can, in general, extract ﬁnancial
information on the foreign affiliates, capturing
investment levels, and sales volumes. However, this
information is not available for smaller ﬁrms, and
18In the UK, for example, larger companies report ‘earn-
ings from overseas’, but this may include proﬁts on
currency transactions undertaken abroad, or sales of
overseas assets, for example.
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the coverage is poor in many developing countries.
As such, we have taken the decision to capture as
wide a data set as possible, but the measure of FDI
as a binary variable we acknowledge is restrictive.
Implications
Our results support the moves worldwide to
implement further anti-smoking legislation. India
has moved to ban FDI in this sector, and many
countries that we list as ‘no ban’ countries have
subsequently enacted anti-smoking legislation
(ANR, 2014). China planned to end smoking in
indoor spaces by the end of 2014 (CNN, 2014),
and Japan now has restrictions on smoking in
some prefectures (regions) (ANR, 2014). In addi-
tion, further work is required around ﬁrm strategy
in this domain. Our model has assumed that FDI
in this sector is market-seeking. Of course this may
not be the case, and recent decisions taken in India
to ban FDImust be seen in this light. For example,
there are a growing number of tobacco companies
among emerging market MNEs who may respond
differently to such regulation. We know that, in
general, emerging market MNEs rely much more
on CSAs than on FSAs to facilitate international-
ization, and as regulation of tobacco in emerging
markets still lags behind the developed world, we
may see further growth in internationalization
from these countries. Equally, it is well known
that emerging market MNEs have different own-
ership and governance structures from traditional
MNEs, and as a result respond differently to insti-
tutions and institutional voids, so we may observe
different ﬁrm-level responses to such bans in the
future. In the Indian context, the view of national
policy-makers was that India would be seen as an
attractive location for both efficiency-seeking FDI
and market-seeking FDI, leading to lower prices
domestically and greater health risks in the future.
Our results conﬁrm the wisdom of the decision to
ban FDI in this sector in India.
Appendix A1: No ban countries in 2009
by HDI ranking
Low HDI Medium HDI High HDI Very high HDI Not classiﬁed
Afghanistan Cape Verde Albania Barbados Ant. and Barb.
Angola China Armenia Brunei Cuba
Bangladesh Congo, Rep. Azerbaijan Czech Rep. Dominica
Burma Dom. Rep. Bahamas Denmark Grenada
Burundi El Salvador Belarus Greece Kiribati
Comoros Fiji Belize Hungary Lebanon
Congo, DR Gabon Chile Japan Marsh. Islands
Coˆte d’Ivoire Guyana Costa Rica Korea, South Nauru
Ethiopia Honduras Croatia Luxembourg Palau
Ghana Kyrgyzstan Georgia Monaco St Kitts & Nev.
Guinea-Biss. Micronesia Jamaica Poland St Vincent
Haiti Mongolia Latvia Qatar Samoa
Iraq Namibia Macedonia San Marino
Liberia Nicaragua Russia Somalia
Malawi Paraguay Tonga Tuvalu
Mauritania Sao Tome Tunisia Vanuatu
Nepal Sol. Islands Ukraine
Papua NG Suriname
Rwanda Syria
Senegal Tajikistan
Sierra Leone Timor-Leste
Sudan Uzbekistan
Tanzania Vietnam
Togo
Source: United Nations (2009). Human Development Report. New York
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Appendix A2: Descriptive statistics
(overall data)
Variable Observations Mean Std dev.
FDI 912 0.444 0.497
FDI in No Ban 912 0.221 0.415
ln Sales 912 9.817 2.687
ln Sales² 912 103.574 58.675
Change in Sales 774 0.040 0.706
ln Cash ﬂow 912 4.614 4.590
Intangible/Total Assets 912 0.034 0.094
Age 912 32.093 34.368
Age² 912 2209.821 5633.157
Number of Directors 912 6.803 6.101
Herﬁndahl 912 0.661 0.380
No_Ban_Home 912 0.334 0.472
Tobacco Tax 912 71.072 16.977
Appendix A3: FDI in no ban countries
with the change in sales
Variables FDI in no ban FDI in no ban
Percentage Change in Sales 0.0374** 0.0368*
(0.0181) (0.0196)
ln Cash ﬂow 0.0136*** 0.00791**
(0.00420) (0.00403)
Intangible/Total Assets 1.338*** 1.019***
(0.234) (0.193)
Age 0.00164 0.00234**
(0.00103) (0.00107)
Age² −1.29e–05** −2.06e–05***
(5.39e-06) (6.06e-06)
Number of Directors 0.00919*** 0.0125***
(0.00238) (0.00273)
Herﬁndahl 0.0434 0.0616
(0.0389) (0.0384)
No_Ban_Home 0.428***
(0.0388)
Tobacco Tax −0.00569***
(0.00111)
Observations 774 774
LR (8) 274.788 165.988
Prob> LR 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R² 0.3311 0.2000
Correct predictions 85.66 82.82%
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05,
Appendix A4: Correlation coefficients
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